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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
Plaintiff/Respondent, \ 
V. 1 
THOMAS M. BECKSTEAD-PORTER, \ 
Defendant/Appellant. \ 
: Case No. 890309-CA 
\ Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of Aggravated Arson, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 
(Supp. 1989), and Insurance Fraud, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-521 (1978). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at 
trial to support the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of 
aggravated arson and insurance fraud? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Thomas Beckstead-Porter, appeals from a 
judgment and conviction of Aggravated Arson, a first degree 
felony, and Insurance Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-103 (Supp. 1989) and 76-6-521 (1978), 
respectively (R. 134-36). Defendant was convicted after a jury 
trial on August 5, 1988, in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A. 
Rokich, Judge, presiding. Id. Judge Rokich suspended defendant's 
prison sentence and placed him on probation for a period of 
eighteen (18) months and ordered him to serve thirty (30) days in 
jail. £d. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of November 1, 1987, a fire broke out in 
the basement of defendant's home in Salt Lake County (T. 123, 
138). A neighbor called "911" at 10:31 p.m. (T. 269). The fire 
department arrived at approximately 10:38, had the fire under 
control by 10:44, and had the fire out by 10:52 (T. 271). The 
fire inspectors determined that the fire had burned approximately 
15 minutes (T. 195). At the time of the fire, defendant was the 
only person present in the house (T. 500). Defendant's wife was 
in Phoenix, Arizona (T. 546). 
The fire originated in a laundry room in defendant's 
basement (T. 155-56, 265). The room sustained heavy damage and 
had been subjected to a so called "flashover" (T. 266). A 
flashover occurs when everything in a room burns (T. 251, 266). 
The investigation revealed that the flashover occurred before the 
firefighters arrived (T. 272). 
When the fire department arrived, one firefighter 
observed an iron in the laundry room in an upright position (T. 
143, T. 150, 153). Andrew Glad, Assistant Fire Chief of the 
Sandy Fire Department, removed the iron from the laundry room 
because he thought it might have been involved with the fire (T. 
156). No other immediate cause of the fire was observed (T. 
156). Glad discovered the iron on the floor but observed that 
the ironing board had been moved on the night of the fire (T. 
159, 162). The iron was still plugged into the electrical outlet 
(T. 168). Glad delivered the iron to Captain Dave Meldrum of the 
Sandy Fire Department (T. 156). 
Captain Meldrum investigated the fire scene on November 
4th (T. 240). In his investigation, he found no fire hazards 
outside the home (T. 244). Meldrum observed two broken windows 
to the basement of defendant's house, jki. He determined that 
both windows were broken either during the fire or shortly 
afterward based on the smoke stains on the glass (T. 247). At 
the time the firemen arrived, the basement door was locked with 
no signs of forced entry (T. 265). 
In the laundry room, Meldrum observed burning which 
extended from the floor and across the ceiling (T. 272). Melted 
plastic on the ironing board indicated the heat from the fire 
came from above the ironing board (T. 273). Additionally, the 
rust patterns on the ironing board indicated that the top of the 
board received the most heat, while the plastic caps on the 
bottom of the ironing board did not completely melt, indicating 
minimal heat (T. 274). 
Near this location, Meldrum discovered some strips of 
burned material, evidently part of a Halloween mummy costume made 
of bed sheets which defendant used few days previously (T. 165, 
198, 267). Subsequently, the National Fire Academy in 
Washington, D.C., informed Meldrum that bed sheets ignite at a 
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temperature of 525 to 560 degrees (T. 275, 280). The plastic 
caps on the feet of the ironing board had an ignition temperature 
of 200 degrees, the lowest of any item in the laundry room (T. 
290). Other burned materials in the room had much higher 
ignition points; for example, the wood had an ignition 
temperature of 800 degrees and the aluminum wiring 1210 degrees 
(T. 290-91). 
At trial, Meldrum testified that fires could be ignited 
in three ways: acts of providence, accidents, or intentionally 
(T. 280). He discussed each possibility in turn. He defined a 
providential fire as one caused by "catastrophe, lightning, 
earthquakes, that sort of thing." (T. 281). He went on to say 
that "[s]ince we had no lightning strikes, no earthquakes, 
nothing else that would indicate a providential fire, we rules 
[sic] that out immediately." Id. 
Meldrum also eliminated an accidental cause of fire. 
He excluded an electrical fire since no electrical source existed 
in the area of the fire origin (T. 281). He ruled out 
spontaneous ignition, accelerants, children playing with matches, 
cigarettes, natural gas leaks, and a malfunctioning water heater 
or furnace (T. 291-92). 
He also determined the iron was not the source of the 
fire. He based his conclusion on several factors including the 
statements of an eyewitness that the iron was upright on the 
ironing board when the firefighters entered the room (T. 143, 
150, 153, 282-84). Additionally, defendant told Meldrum that he 
had been in the room only a few minutes before the fire (T. 282). 
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Meldrum testified that an iron fire takes considerable time to 
ignite and produces a great deal of smoke which defendant would 
have noticed (T. 282). He further explained that an iron will 
start a fire only if it meets certain conditions (T. 282). 
First, the iron must be encapsulated in flammable material with 
no air flow (T. 283). He considered encapsulation unlikely in 
this instance because insufficient material existed to 
encapsulate the iron (T. 283). 
As part of his investigation, Meldrum bought an iron 
identical to defendant's iron (T. 224, 284). Setting the 
thermostat on the new iron to a point identical to that on 
defendant's iron, the maximum temperature attained was 395 
degrees (T. 234, 284, 286). The manufacturer confirmed the 
maximum temperature setting (T. 289). Meldrum testified that the 
iron could not radiate enough heat to travel three to four feet 
to melt the caps on the feet of the ironing board (T. 291). 
His tests further indicated that the iron was on during 
the fire (T. 318). He discovered that the fire caused a short in 
the iron, but the short did not cause the fire (T. 287). He 
explained that the iron did not indicate the type of damage an 
iron fire would cause since an iron fire would be a smoldering, 
sooty fire (T. 286, 335, 381, 396). Based on his investigation 
and tests, Meldrum concluded that the fire was intentionally 
induced by a lighter or match on the Halloween mummy costume 
consisting of bedding material (T. 298). 
Concurrently with Meldrum's investigation, James Ashby 
independently investigated the fire for defendant's homeowners 
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insurance company (T. 173). Ashby also determined that the fire 
started in the laundry room (T. 185-86). Because of the lack of 
damage to the face of the iron, Ashby discounted the iron as the 
source of the fire (T. 216). He testified that an iron fire 
would produce smoke which would in turn cause charring on the 
face of the iron (T. 220). He found no charring or black 
substance on the face of the iron. Id. He opined that the 
carpet in the laundry room had burned before the iron fell to the 
floor (T. 530-31). He based his opinion on the fact that only 
residue of previously burned carpet appeared on the edge of the 
iron. Id. 
Ross Watson, an appliance repairman, testified that the 
iron involved in the fire had a safety feature designed to shut 
off the iron if the thermostat malfunctioned (T. 227). He also 
stated that he had not seen an overheated iron in ten to fifteen 
years (T. 228). He said that if the iron had overheated as the 
result of a manufacturer's defect, the bottom of the iron would 
have melted or bubbled (T. 228, 230). 
Coincidently, defendant contacted his insurance agent 
just three days before the fire and attempted to change insurance 
companies from Farmers to Aetna and increase the coverage on his 
home from $64,000 to $70,000 (T. 74, 98-101). The day after the 
fire, defendant again contacted his insurance agent to make a 
claim on his new Aetna policy (T. 106). Defendant also filed a 
claim on his Farmers policy (T. 70). Two days before the fire, 
defendant disconnected the smoke alarm installed in his house (T. 
548-49). 
Defendant speculates that his dogs knocked over the 
iron sometime between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., encapsulating it 
in his Halloween costume, and eventually causing the fire about 
10:30 p.m. (T. 437, 512-14, 551, 582-83). He relies on the 
testimony of two experts from the State Crime Lab at Weber State 
College (T. 442, 465). The first expert, Art Terkelsen, 
testified that the melted material on the iron matched the burned 
carpeting as well as defendant's Halloween costume (T. 445). 
However, he could not determine whether the iron caused the fire 
(T. 453-54). He said that had the iron started the fire, there 
would have been scorching around the iron (T. 455-56, 459). 
Defendant's second expert witness, Dwayne Moyes, 
testified that encapsulation could occur, producing heat in 
excess of 525 degrees (T. 471). Moyes encapsulated an iron in 
his lab at a temperature of 325 degrees and determined that smoke 
was produced only three to five minutes before ignition (T. 473-
74). However, on cross-examination, he testified that he only 
heated the iron for a half an hour and then terminated the 
experiment because he did not want to risk a lab fire (T. 478-
80). He explained that he calculated when the iron would have 
reached 525 degrees (T. 478-80). He also testified that the iron 
had Ma bit of browning" from his experiment (T. 484). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury had sufficient evidence to convict defendant 
of aggravated arson and insurance fraud. The state called three 
expert witnesses to establish that the fire was not accidental, 
but intentional. The state also established that defendant 
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attempted to change his insurance company and increase the amount 
of his policy only a few days before the fire. If believed, the 
State'8 direct and circumstantial evidence was sufficient to 
establish all the elements of the crimes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict. However, a review of the evidence reveals that 
defendants claim is without merit. 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, the 
standard to be applied by an appellate court is narrow. 
[W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury verdict 
for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reason-
able minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted. 
State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(1983); accord State v. McCardle, Utah, 652 
P.2d 942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the 
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. It is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
It must be noted that defendant does not directly 
challenge the sufficiency of the insurance fraud conviction, 
apparently because it is dependent on the aggravated arson 
conviction. Simply, defendant's insurance claim of accidental 
loss would be fraudulent if he intentionally set the fire. 
and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses . . . State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 
229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonable be made, our inquiry stops. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
In the instant case, the jury convicted defendant of 
the offenses of aggravated arson and insurance fraud, which 
provide as follows: 
76-6-103. Aggravated Arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson 
if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfuly damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any 
person not a participant in the offense is 
in the structure or vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 (Supp. 1989). 
False or fraudulent insurance claim—Punishment 
as for theft. 
Every person who presents, or causes to be 
presented, any false or fraudulent claim, 
or any proof in support of any such claim, 
upon any contract of insurance for the 
payment of any loss, or who prepares, 
makes or subscribes any account, 
certificate of survey, affidavit or proof 
of loss, or other book, paper or writing, 
with intent to present or use the same, or 
to allow it to be presented or used, in 
support of any such claim is punishable as 
in the manner prescribed for theft of 
property of like value. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-521 (1978). 
In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court explained 
that in reviewing the sufficiency of an aggravated arson and 
insurance fraud conviction, "it is a well-settled rule that 
guilt of the accused." State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 
1986). -Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded as inferior 
evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a 
jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction.*1 ^d. at 127. 
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury 
could infer that on the night of the fire, defendant waited until 
his father-in-law and brother-in-law left his house between 8:30 
and 9:00 p.m. (T. 550), talked to his wife on the telephone from 
approximately 10:12 to 10:20 p.m. (T. 300-01), made sure the iron 
was plugged in and turned on (T. 318), and set the basement 
laundry room on fire by igniting his Halloween mummy costume (T. 
398). Defendant then went to his neighbor's house and reported 
that his house was on fire (T. 121, 489-90). 
The laundry room reached flashpoint before 10:38 p.m., 
when the fire department arrived (T. 272). Less than ten minutes 
had passed from ignition to flash point (T. 268). Peering 
through the window of the laundry room, a fireman observed the 
iron sitting upright on the ironing board (T. 142-43). Sometime 
during the salvage and overhaul stage, the iron was knocked from 
the ironing board to the floor where it was retrieved by Chief 
Glad and given to Captain Meldrum (T. 159, 160, 375). 
The State's experts ruled out the iron as the cause of 
the fire for several reasons. First, the iron was in an upright 
position on the ironing board when the fire department arrived at 
the scene (T. 142-43). Second, defendant stated that he had been 
in the laundry room only minutes before the fire (T. 282). 
Meldrum testified that it takes a considerable amount of time to 
ignite an iron fire and it would produce a great deal of smoke 
prior to ignition (T. 282). Third, an iron must be encapsulated 
in flammable material without airflow to obtain sufficient heat 
to ignite (T. 283). Meldrum testified that insufficient material 
existed in the area to encapsulate the iron. Ld. Fourth, the 
maximum heat produced from the iron was insufficient to obtain 
the ignition temperature of the bed sheet material (T. 234, 275, 
280, 284, 286, 289). Fifth, the fire was not ignited by an 
electrical short in the iron (T. 287). Sixth, the face of the 
iron lacked evidence of charring which would have resulted if the 
iron produced the fire (T. 216). Seventh, Ashby concluded that 
the carpet on the laundry room floor had burned prior to the iron 
falling to the floor (T. 530-31). Finally, Watson stated that 
the iron lacked melting or-bubbling which would have occurred had 
the iron overheated (T. 228, 230). 
Based upon the evidence, it could be reasonably 
inferred that: (1) defendant was the only person in the house at 
the time of the fire, and (2) the fire was not accidental but was 
intentionally set by human hands. While motive is not an element 
of the crime, the insurance proceeds provided a compelling reason 
for defendant to ignite his house on fire. Viewing the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the verdict, a jury could have 
reasonably concluded that defendant intentionally ignited his 
house on fire to collect the insurance money. 
Defendant appears to further argue that the evidence 
was insufficient because some evidence, if believed, tends to 
show that defendant did not commit the offense. In making this 
argument, defendant ignores the fundamental principle that a 
jury's belief or disbelief of a defendant's theory of a crime is 
a matter within the jury's exclusive prerogative to weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses' testimony. State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 
229 (Utah 1980); Efco Distrib., Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 
412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966); Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 9 
Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959). The basic function of the 
jury is to weigh the conflicting evidence and draw conclusions 
from it. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986). Merely 
weighing the number of witnesses is never dispositive. State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1988), on reconsideration 776 
P.2d 631 (Utah 1989). Despite testimony to the contrary, the 
jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant 
committed the offenses of which he was convicted. State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
DATED this <^%9*—day of October, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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